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ABSTRACT 
An important component of any counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is the 
successful use of population and resource control measures.  If utilized correctly, PRCMs 
are powerful operational tools that can be used to break the cycle of insurgent violence 
and establish the security necessary for all other COIN campaign initiatives. 
This thesis draws from literatures on social movement theory and COIN to 
develop a framework that would assist COIN force commanders to better select and 
implement the appropriate PRCMs for success in their areas of operations.  The thesis 
argues for developing a comprehensive PRCM plan across the U.S. military’s operational 
spectrum (strategic/operational/tactical) and for factoring in the nature of the local 
environment and local concepts of legitimacy before proceeding.   
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After the Vietnam War, an entire generation of U.S. military officers said that 
they had learned their lessons and would not make the same mistakes again.  But did they 
learn the right lessons?  The post-Vietnam U.S. military focused on conventional warfare 
and created, quite possibly, the best conventional military ever.  But at the same time, it 
did not think about, train on, or resource counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine or practice.   
Following Desert Storm in 1991, many military thinkers and pundits declared that 
the U.S. military had finally vanquished the ghosts of the Vietnam War.  The lopsided 
victory against Saddam Hussein’s Army was seen as a vindication of the U.S. military’s 
post-Vietnam doctrine.  But they were comparing apples (conventional warfare) to 
oranges (counterinsurgent warfare).  The conventional war fought in Desert Storm played 
to the U.S. military’s strengths and had little relevance to the military situation or our 
performance in Vietnam.  It took the monumental terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Global 
War on Terrorism for the U.S. military to revisit the COIN question and the ghosts of 
Vietnam. 
Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. swiftly toppled the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan.  Operation Enduring Freedom was a relatively easy mission that led to the 
rapid downfall of an unpopular regime.   
The U.S. quickly changed its focus and, a little over a year later, invaded and 
occupied Iraq.  Operation Iraqi Freedom was also an easy conventional victory that 
initially enjoyed a degree of popular support, particularly by the Shi’ite majority 
population. 
In each case, but particularly in Iraq, the U.S. military’s conventional capabilities 
proved to be unmatched.  But soon after these impressive victories, insurgencies 
developed in both countries, which completely changed the face of the battlefield.  Both 
wars became insurgencies with the enemy living, fighting, and hiding among the 
population.  The U.S. military struggled to refit its conventional paradigm for the rigors 
of counterinsurgency operations.  In both countries, we failed.  We conducted kinetic 
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operations that were of limited value and, in some cases, caused more damage to our 
COIN effort than the raids helped to solve.  This modus operandi had a cascading effect 
and we soon found ourselves losing two counterinsurgent wars. 
The poor performances in Afghanistan and Iraq caused many to seriously 
reexamine the efficacy of U.S. strategies.  The year 2006 saw a renaissance of COIN 
thought among many senior U.S. military and governmental officials.  They turned the 
focus of our COIN efforts from enemy-centric to population-centric.  The result of this 
renaissance was the publication of the U.S. Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-24 
Counterinsurgency in December 2006.  In FM 3-24, population-centric COIN is codified 
as U.S. military COIN doctrine.   
Population-centric COIN broadly defines the population’s support as the key to 
victory.  In other words, it is the population, not killing enemy combatants, that wins an 
insurgency.  Further, FM 3-24 defines the relationship between the insurgent and the 
counterinsurgent as a mainly political struggle wherein “each side aims to get the people 
to accept its governance or authority as legitimate” (p. 1–1).  
Gaining the population’s support is accomplished mainly by strengthening the 
government’s legitimacy.  Securing the population’s support is a zero-sum game in which 
the segment of the population that supports the insurgency does not support the 
government, and vice versa.  Therefore, the effective counterinsurgent needs to increase 
the government’s legitimacy while simultaneously delegitimizing the insurgents as much 
as possible.  This battle for legitimacy sets the stage for how a revolutionary war should 
be fought. 
Many factors determine how legitimacy is either won or lost.  The single biggest 
factor determining a government’s legitimacy is its ability to protect its population 
against the violence that occurs during a revolutionary war.  Therefore, the first and most 
important step a successful counterinsurgent must take is to ensure the population’s 
security.  Once security is established, other factors important to the population and to 
legitimacy can be addressed, such as ensuring the provision of essential services and 
responding to the population’s legitimate grievances. 
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The insurgent, on the other hand, will try to destroy the government’s legitimacy 
by using violence to create chaos and then offer himself as a legitimate alternative who 
can succeed where the government has failed.  Insurgents will play to popular grievances 
and any other issues they can leverage to further erode the government’s legitimacy.  
This process increases the insurgency’s support from, and its ties to, the population. 
Respected French military officer, COIN strategist, and author David Galula 
points out that the government must play to its strengths and work with the population.  
In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, he observes that the 
people are static and relatively easy to access, whereas the insurgent is hard to find and 
identify (Galula, 1964, p. 58).  Galula gained these insights from his extensive studies of 
insurgencies in China, Indochina, and his own experiences fighting in Algeria.  It is easy 
to see his significant influence on U.S. military doctrine—his book is listed as one of the 
“classics” of COIN theory in the FM 3-24 bibliography, and he is considered to be one of 
the premier COIN intellectuals by population-centric COIN enthusiasts. 
The idea of population-centric COIN is not new.  Galula published his book in 
1964.  Similarly, Sir Robert Thompson, a British military officer and COIN expert with 
experience in Burma, Malaya, and Vietnam, wrote specifically about the utility of 
population-centric COIN in Vietnam during the early phases of that war.  Recently, a new 
crop of military officers and pundits has championed the principles of population-centric 
COIN.  These COIN thinkers include retired military officers Dr. David Kilcullen 
(Australia), John Nagl (U.S.), and the Pulitzer Prize-winning author Thomas Ricks.  Each 
has penned influential books that promote population-centric COIN arguments, complete 
with contemporary battlefield examples drawn from around the world. 
Also listed in the FM 3-24 bibliography is the Chinese Communist revolutionary 
leader Mao Zedong’s book, On Guerrilla Warfare.  Mao emphasizes the centrality of the 
population to revolutionary warfare, though he writes from the perspective of the 
guerrilla.  He likens the people to water and the insurgents to fish, and says that the 
insurgent, like a fish, cannot live out of the water (Mao, 1961, p. 93). 
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To be sure, there are detractors who do not believe in the theories and practice of 
population-centric COIN.  They consider COIN operations to be like any other military 
operation and that an enemy-centric approach can solve the military problems posed by 
an insurgency.  Over 100 years ago, Colonel C. E. Callwell, a veteran of many of the 
British Empire’s small wars, prescribed an enemy-centric approach for defeating 
insurgencies in his book, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.  He believed that 
the best way to wage war against irregulars was by conducting a strategy he called 
counter-strokes (Callwell, 1906, p. 128).  This strategy was to be executed by highly 
“mobile columns” that endeavored “to kill them [the insurgents] or wound them, or at 
least hunt them from their homes” (Callwell, 1906, p. 146).  Callwell cites as successful 
examples the French in Algeria in 1841, the U.S. struggle against the western Indian 
tribes, and the British in South Africa during the Second Boer War (Callwell, 1906, p. 
128–137). 
Another enemy-centric COIN advocate, retired U.S. Army Colonel Harry 
Summers Jr., dismisses much of the population-centric approach in his book, On 
Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.  In it, he claims that the Vietnam War 
was lost not because we used a conventional strategy, but because we did not use enough 
of the right conventional strategy.   
There are even some current critics who claim that the U.S. military has gone 
overboard and become too narrowly focused on population-centric COIN.  Chief among 
these critics is U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile who is the current director of the Military 
History Program at the United States Military Academy and was a battalion commander 
in Iraq during 2006.  He argues that from both a “theoretical and historical standpoint” 
the population does not need to be the center of gravity (Gentile, 2009).  Further, he 
claims that this doctrine has taken over how the army “should perceive and respond to 
security problems around the world” (Gentile, 2009). 
Colonel Gentile believes that this narrow focus has caused the “atrophy” of 
conventional skills, which could lead to a significant strategic failure in the future.  He 
points to Israel in southern Lebanon in 2006 and the British Army between the World 
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Wars as examples of this phenomenon (Gentile, 2009).  But thinkers such as Summers 
and Gentile are definitely in the minority at the moment.   
The current high tide of belief in population-centric COIN is based primarily on 
assessments of the successful implementation by Coalition forces in Iraq from mid-2007 
of something somewhat incorrectly called “the Surge.”  The Surge is said to have marked 
the replacement of an enemy-centric strategy by a population-centric model. 
Key to facilitating the government’s attempts to build legitimacy and separate the 
insurgents from the population in any population-centric approach is the implementation 
of population and resource controls measures (PRCM).  PRCMs are broadly defined as 
measures used to physically separate the population from the insurgents in order to 
protect citizens and allow the government to regain popular support.  If done correctly, 
PRCMs should have the added benefit of producing intelligence that will help 
government forces identify and eliminate the insurgents who remain embedded in the 
population.  I will expand upon the definition and objectives of PRCMs in the next 
chapter.  For now, I will note that Galula considered population control to be “the most 
critical step in the process” because it allowed for the transition of “emphasis on military 
operations to emphasis on political ones” (Galula, 1964, p. 81). 
This thesis focuses on the population-centric COIN approach because it is current 
U.S. Army doctrine, employed in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  But, regardless of the 
COIN doctrine that you subscribe to, PRCMs are equally useful and relevant actions that 
help to increase the government’s success while reducing the insurgency’s effectiveness. 
The argument to be made here is that since PRCMs are vital to the very basis of 
any COIN effort, it is important that we understand how to properly select and implement 
the correct PRCMs to achieve the intended outcome without negative unintended 
consequences.  Currently, there is a lot of COIN literature that extols the virtues of 
PRCMs, to include the U.S. Army COIN manual, COIN strategy articles, and even daily 
blogs.  The theme they all have in common is that, when done correctly, PRCMs can 
drive a wedge between the insurgents and the population, giving the counterinsurgent the 
necessary tools to defeat the insurgency.  What needs greater clarification is how exactly 
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this can be accomplished.  There is little written to explain how a commander should 
select, implement, and execute PRCMs.  A gap exists between the objectives that COIN 
theorists claim PRCMs can produce and the published literature on the actual tactics 
necessary to pursue those objectives.  To more effectively utilize PRCMs, we must 
bridge this gap.  That, in turn, requires a close look at the complex and interrelated 
variables that dictate the success or failure of PRCMs. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis offers a framework that takes into account the significance of both 
environmental factors and legitimacy concerns.  I believe that taking these into account is 
essential in the implementation of a successful PRCM plan.  I have come to these 
conclusions based on my research, military training, and firsthand experiences. 
Chapter II details PRCM background information.  Here, I draw on my research 
into the relevant literature about the theory and history of COIN, PRCMs, and social 
movement theory (SMT).  Chapter III explains the importance of the interactive nature of 
what I call PRCM factors.   
Chapter IV is a fictional narrative that illustrates how a U.S. Army unit could 
develop and implement a comprehensive PRCM plan.  The goal of this chapter is to 
demonstrate to COIN practitioners a contemporary and practical example of how PRCMs 
can be used effectively. 
In her book, Narratives in Social Science Research, Barbara Czarniawska details 
the power of a narrative as an educational tool.  Following that logic, Chapter IV’s 
narrative will allow the reader to envision, in a practical and easily understandable 
context, the fundamentals of my argument.   
This narrative draws on research done for this thesis and events I witnessed in 
Iraq during 2006.  This narrative is written specifically with the tactical level leader at the 
battalion level and below in mind. 
Chapter V concludes with recommendations for future study and research. 
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II. PRCM BACKGROUND 
Control is defined as “directing influence over” or “to have power over” 
(“Control,” 2009).  Throughout history, leaders have struggled with how to best control 
their populations and lands.  The exercise of control usually has two broad goals: to 
ensure a social group or society prospers, and to maintain or gain more power.  As people 
began to formalize this process, they also began to study the ‘science’ of social control.   
The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology defines social control as “practices 
developed by social groups of all kinds that enforce or encourage conformity and deal 
with behavior that violates accepted norms” (“Social Control,” 1991).  The dictionary 
further distinguishes the two basic processes of social control as the “internalization of 
norms and values” and “the use of sanctions with regards to rule-breakers and 
nonconforming acts” (“Social Control,” 1991). 
As mentioned in the introduction, current U.S. Army doctrine views the 
population as the center of gravity in COIN operations.  Therefore, the ability to 
influence and control the population is essential.  In The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 
Yale University political science professor Stathis Kalyvas has shown that there is a very 
strong and positive correlation between control and a population’s level of collaboration 
(Kalyvas, 2006, p. 111).  He further hypothesizes that “the higher the level of control 
exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with 
this political actor will be” (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 111).  This directly relates back to social 
control in the case of COIN because the collaborating population helps the government 
achieve conformity through its own conformity and information sharing about non-
conformers. 
Through COIN operations, the U.S. military seeks to encourage conformity and 
identify ‘non-conformists’ via the use of PRCMs.  Though PRCMs are essential to 
COIN, there is a limited amount of theory or literature related to them to review. 
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I divide the existing PRCM related literature into four categories: sociological 
theory; COIN theory; U.S. military doctrine; and, finally, narrative accounts in which 
writers describe PRCM efforts in the course of describing COIN operations.   
Important to this study is Ted Robert Gurr’s book Why Men Rebel.  In it, Gurr 
seeks to understand the dynamics of political violence in order to gauge what he calls the 
“revolutionary potential” of a nation.  With this understanding, Gurr hopes to be able to 
“estimate the effects of various actions on that potential” (Gurr, 1970, p. X).  Of 
particular interest to the study of PRCMs are Gurr’s insights on the importance of the 
close correlation between governmental legitimacy and population compliance (Gurr, 
1970, p. 186). 
Gurr’s work is critical in SMT, which seeks, at least in part, to understand the 
complex social interactions that occur during collective action events such as protests, 
counter-government or counter-policy political movements, and revolutionary 
insurgencies.  Those who study the effects of repression on collective action, for instance, 
try to determine the consequences, both intended and unintended, of repression.  SMT 
greatly enhances our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of PRCM use. 
Much of the COIN theory literature focuses on tactical measures and avoids 
discussing repression dynamics.  If one examines the writings of C. E. Callwell, David 
Galula, John Nagl, and Robert Thompson, their views range from near scorched-earth 
measures such as Callwell’s recommendations to destroy the enemy’s herds and villages 
(Callwell, 1906, p. 145), which have limited contemporary applicability, to Nagl, Galula, 
and Thompson’s ideas of working with and within the populations that counterinsurgents 
are attempting to control.  Though COIN theorists’ views on tactics vary greatly, they all 
agree with the general premise that one must control populations and resources to 
effectively starve the insurgency of its manpower and material requirements. 
U.S. Army population and resource control doctrine is encapsulated in three 
instructional books or field manuals (FM) which seem to be especially influenced by 
Thompson’s writings, judging from the generous use of some of his terminology.  These 
are FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, and finally 
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FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations.  Collectively, they offer a broad overview 
of PRCMs.  They focus on the objectives of PRCMs and then quickly move on to the 
measures themselves, with little discussion about PRCM plan development or 
implementation.  FMI 3-07.22, an “expired” FM, actually does the best job of laying out 
a guideline for PRCM planning, but the updated versions (FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2) 
dropped most of this material. 
In my opinion, the most complete source of information available on PRCMs is 
the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) Population and Resource Control (PRC) 
Handbook (1st SFG Handbook).  This was written by a U.S. Army unit with the express 
intention of training its soldiers on the planning and execution of PRCMs.  It includes 
PRCM background information, theoretical concepts, planning considerations, a list of 
common PRCM tasks, and the guidance needed to successfully conduct them. 
The 1st SFG Handbook defines population and resource control as:  
a wide range of activities conducted to control the populace and 
designated material resources in order to facilitate three objectives: 1. 
Deny human and material resources to the insurgents; 2. Isolate the 
insurgent physically and psychologically from the populace; 3. Identify 
and neutralize insurgent infrastructure (1st SFG Handbook, p. 5). 
As mentioned previously, there is now an extensive literature detailing U.S. COIN 
practices.  If read closely, one can find descriptions of PRCMs in these writings.  Of 
particular note, David Killcullen’s The Accidental Guerrilla and Thomas Ricks’ The 
Gamble illustrate, through multiple contemporary examples, the extensive use of PRCMs 
in current COIN campaigns.  Both of these authors, through their narratives, describe the 
benefits that can occur when PRCMs are used correctly. 
To better illustrate these control measures, I have collected a list of common 
PRCMs and developed the following menu.  To the extent possible, I have tried to 
organize this according to the military operational level (strategic/operational/tactical) 
into which the specific approaches best fit.  What is important to keep in mind is that 
oftentimes these measures can be utilized across all or none of the three operational levels 
depending on the complex variables that are specific to each different COIN campaign. 
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Figure 1.   Population and resource control measures menu  
In order to clarify the distinctions I draw by placing certain PRCMs in a particular 
operation level, I offer the following justification for my rationale.  This example should 
help to illustrate the thought process I went through when deciding where each PRCM 
should be placed.  I take tactical-level PRCM #10; paying reparations for damages and 
aid coerced by insurgents should be conducted at the lowest level possible.  Numerous 
benefits should flow from granting tactical units the responsibility and authority to 
distribute these reparations.  First, tactical level units should have the knowledge of how 
to best distribute the reparations locally.   
Second, by paying the reparations, the tactical unit will build rapport with the 
local population.  This will reduce the population’s frustration level with the government 
and could lead to an increase in legitimacy. 
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Finally, tactical level units may gain important intelligence during the reparations 
payment process.  It would only be natural that the people receiving these reparations 
would offer, at a minimum, information about planned future attacks that may be used in 
offensive operations against the insurgents. 
There may be further debate as to where a certain PRCM fits in the operational 
spectrum but, as mentioned above, this is a general guideline, and these measures often 
fit within and work at multiple levels.  A measure listed as a strategic PRCM that cannot 
be implemented across the entire theater may make sense at the tactical level and should 
be employed there. 
One interesting model for how to categorize PRCMs was introduced by Brigadier 
General Joseph Anderson and Colonel Gary Volesky, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq 
Chief of Staff and his Deputy, in their article A Synchronized Approach to Population 
Control.  In it, they argue that PRCMs cannot be effectively utilized at the tactical level 
alone.  Instead, “strategic and operational-level leaders must plan, coordinate, and 
execute activities that set the conditions for success at the tactical level” (Anderson & 
Volesky, p. 102).  
Anderson and Volesky break down their synchronized plan to correspond with the 
U.S. military’s doctrinal levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.  The strategic 
level focuses on PRCMs that only a strategic level commander has the ability and 
resources to accomplish.  These tactics include a nationwide census, national 
identification cards, international border control, and long-term economic prosperity 
programs (Anderson & Volesky, p. 102).  The authors believe that these steps are 
necessary precursors to a comprehensive PRCM plan.  These large-scope PRCMs create 
a foundation that allows for operational and tactical PRCMs to have a real impact.  
Undertaking national-level programs also generates immense amounts of intelligence and 
lays the foundation for law enforcement and dispute resolution by establishing property 
ownership records and business licenses.   
At the operational level, Anderson and Volesky emphasize “senior-leader 
engagement” with influential social and political leaders (sheiks, imams, mayors) “in 
 12
order to gain [their] support or produce a desired effect” (Anderson & Volesky, p. 102).  
Additionally, COIN force leaders must allocate and distribute the necessary assets (civil 
affairs, public affairs, engineering) to support tactical operations.  By doing this, 
operational commanders build legitimacy by developing “buy-in” support from the local 
social/political leaders.  Then, they can prioritize and allocate their assets at the tactical 
level to ensure synchronization across the battlefield. 
Finally, at the tactical level, the authors propose that COIN forces use offensive 
operations (cordon and searches, raids) combined with other PRCMs to provide security 
for the population.  This security should help break the cycle of violence, fostering the 
government’s ability to build legitimacy across all governmental sectors and making 
improvements in security permanent.     
The authors conclude their article with a discussion about the risks of PRCM use.  
They warn that tactical level commanders must consider how the population perceives 
the PRCMs.  The population may, after time, start to see the PRCMs as an 
inconvenience, especially if violence is reduced.  Popular opinion may turn against their 
use, which could give the insurgency new ammunition to use against the government.  To 
avoid this problem, the authors suggest that the government and COIN forces “define the 
conditions that must be met before the population control measures are reduced,” though 
in the end they believe that the population will understand that “increased security trumps 
inconvenience” (Anderson & Volesky, p.103). 
In essence, Anderson and Volesky have developed a good concept for the 
synchronization of PRCMs throughout a given theater of operations.  Additionally, their 
article advocates strong, strategic-level PRCMs, something that is largely missing from 
the U.S.’s COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although the wars there are eight 
and six years old respectively, neither country has a national identification card, reliable 
census figures, or a weapons registration program to speak of.  These measures could 
prove helpful at the tactical level where, coupled with simple checkpoints, they might 
enable the capture of insurgent leaders.  At the very least, these measures could greatly 
restrict the insurgents’ ability to move, which in the long term affects their ability to 
conduct counter-government operations. 
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What Anderson and Volesky’s argument lacks, however, is a rubric by which 
commanders can select and implement the PRCMs appropriate to accomplish their 
tactical-level goals.  In not addressing the selection and implementation of PRCMs, 
Anderson and Volesky avoid having to work through the complex variables that 
determine where PRCMs will be successful and how PRCMs can either complement the 
COIN campaign or aggravate and turn citizens into active supporters of the insurgency. 
Through research and experience, I believe that there are some key factors which 
commanders can focus on to guide them in their selection and correct implementation of 
the proper PRCMs.  That is what I offer in the next chapter. 
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III. PRCM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The prescriptions in this chapter are not meant to serve as a checklist or a cookie 
cutter solution, but rather as a conceptual guide to help the COIN campaign planner or 
commander work through the complicated process of determining when, how, and which 
PRCMs to use. 
There are two sets of factors that will always need to be taken into account: 
environmental givens and legitimacy concerns or what grants an entity legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population.  Environmental factors include: the local history and politics of an 
area; culturally and sociologically calibrated measures tied to local norms; and the 
identification and cooption of the influential personalities in the area.  A successful 
PRCM plan must take all of these into account so as to not create more insurgents than it 
helps to eliminate. 
The other category—attention to legitimacy—focuses broadly on the population’s 
support for the government’s COIN campaign.  This can further be broken down into 
considerations about the legitimacy of the actor (government and COIN force) and the 
legitimacy of the government’s actions.  Central to population-centric COIN theory, the 
battle for legitimacy is important in PRCM success as well.  The degree of legitimacy the 
government has will determine, to at least some extent, how much or how little resistance 
it encounters from the population when it implements its COIN campaign. 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Just as one size rarely fits all, the environment must be examined based on the 
specific area of operations.  For example, in Iraq areas that are geographically close 
together may have wildly different make-ups/characteristics based on the presence and 
number of religious sects, specific tribal affiliations, presence or absence of historic ties 
to the Saddam regime, or any of a plethora of other identity-related variables.  Therefore, 
it is important that a commander conduct a detailed study of his unit’s areas of operations 
in order to understand and be able to operate effectively when encountering these. 
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In their article All Counterinsurgency is Local, Afghanistan experts Thomas 
Johnson and M. Chris Mason, claim that the U.S.’s approach in Afghanistan has been a 
failure because we have ignored the environmental specifics and history of Afghan 
politics by focusing our efforts on building a strong central Afghan government.  They 
claim that Afghan social and political identity is “rooted in the woleswali: the districts 
within each province that are typically home to a single clan or tribe” (Johnson & Mason, 
p. 2).  The Taliban, on the other hand, understand this and treat the rural Pasthun areas as 
Afghanistan’s true center of gravity (Johnson & Mason, p. 2). 
As of the fall of 2009, positive changes are being implemented in Afghanistan.  
General Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), acknowledges this in his ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance 
which directs his subordinates to “become an expert on the local situation” and to “get to 
know the neighborhood” (McChrystal, p. 5). 
This is vital for PRCMs.  A commander must ensure that PRCMs do not 
inadvertently advantage one political, social, or ethnic group over another.  A commander 
must also use the “least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect” (1st 
SFG, p. 10).  In order to accomplish this, a commander must have a firm understanding 
of the environment in which he is operating. 
B. LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 
There is a series of popular travel books that claim to allow you to travel and live 
in a specific area as if you were a local.  This alludes to the idea that there is certain 
knowledge that only a local knows, and based on his extensive experience, the traveler 
who learns this knowledge will have a “leg up” on others who do not know this 
information.  This is also true in PRCM application.  As Clifford Geertz, the preeminent 
cultural anthropologist, states in his book Local Knowledge: Further Essays in 
Interpretive Anthropology, “the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local, 




Presumably, something is lost when one makes broad characterizations and tries to 
generalize about people.  In other words, when dealing with people one must have local 
knowledge and perspective to be effective. 
The places in the world where insurgencies typically occur usually have weak 
central governments that are unable to gain the loyalty and support of their respective 
populations.  Seth Jones, a political analyst at RAND, found this to be true in Afghanistan 
based on his interviews with tribal leaders.  Jones was told by one tribal elder that “my 
allegiance is to my family first” and “then to my village, sub-tribe, and tribe” (Jones, 
WSJ, p. 2).  This villager could not care less about the government in Kabul. 
Past U.S. policies in Afghanistan have ignored these allegiances by adopting a top 
down approach to nation building, focusing on the development of a strong central 
government when most Afghans live and operate at the local level.   
There are many factors specific to the local arena that must be learned in order to 
operate effectively.  These include knowledge about local history, local politics, 
information about tribal affiliations and feuds, and commercial interests and business 
influences.  FM 3“24’s Chapter Three, “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency, does a good 
job of listing these and other relevant factors. 
Aside from information about the enemy that most military commanders focus on 
during combat operations, it is important to gain an appreciation for and about locals’ 
lives in order to be effective.  This information should include ethnic and religious 
demographics, basic information about the economic infrastructure, and an initial 
understanding of the population’s grievances. 
This information can be gathered from a census or area assessment if one has 
been conducted.  In more mature theaters, much of this information is supplied by 
previous units.  Obviously, if this information does not exist, it is incumbent upon the 
current commander or existing governmental structures to collect and analyze it.  Not 




Knowing and understanding the local history helps the outsider develop a sense 
for why a particular village or tribe has the characteristics and relations with others it 
does.  Taking the time with a village chief or tribal elder to learn the local history should 
never be considered a waste.  Even if the history is not completely accurate, local 
perceptions are local realities.  In the long run, these perceptions are more important than 
‘the’ truth. 
A commander must identify the influential leaders in his area of operations.  
There are two different types of power holders in society: formal and informal (FM 3-24, 
p. 3-9).  Formal power holders usually lead the government, governmental agencies, 
political parties, and unions.  Informal power brokers are much harder to identify.  They 
are not necessarily public in their leadership, but are often more important than the 
formal power brokers (FM 3-24, p. 3–9).  The examples that come to mind range from 
the corrupt cattle baron who controls the local sheriff in a western movie to the popular 
leader of a large religious congregation. 
If it is important to quickly identify these formal and informal leaders, how do we 
accomplish that?  The formal leaders are typically easy to find.  One need only visit 
governmental and official offices, if they exist.  Beyond that, one may employ the 
following steps or observe the following:  ask locals; observe who has the biggest and 
grandest house in the neighborhood; identify who has a lot of employees, or who feels the 
need to employ a personal security force. 
In The Gamble, Thomas Ricks describes how Colonel Sean MacFarland wrestled 
with the problem of sorting through all the real and pretend sheiks in Ramadi.  
MacFarland was able to determine which sheiks had real “wasta” (Iraqi-Arabic word for 
influence) by observing them interacting with each other.  He could tell who had wasta 
“by following who moderated the conversation” (Ricks, 2009, p. 64). 
Once leaders are identified, it is important to regularly engage them.  This will 
help to build personal relationships, which can often trump official responsibilities when 
working through contentious issues.  Excellent examples of tactical leaders successfully 
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engaging local leaders can also be found in Ricks’ book.  Ricks details how Colonel H.R. 
McMaster in Tall Afar and Colonel MacFarland conducted leader engagement to great 
effect (Ricks, 2009, p. 60–64). 
With regard to PRCMs, local leaders can be used in many ways.  During 
planning, the input of local leaders is invaluable.  They may have easier and more locally 
sensible suggestions for accomplishing your objectives.  Gaining their support for control 
measures will increase the likelihood that the PRCMs will succeed and prove legitimate 
in the eyes of the population.  Finally, one can negotiate with local leaders the terms 
under which these PRCMs will be removed. 
By engaging these local leaders, you provide them an outlet for redress and the 
ability to offer input, which can help diffuse major problems that may arise in the future. 
Local politics have a long history of importance in insurgencies.  Mao Zedong’s 
Chinese “national united front” was able to successfully “dominate local politics” which 
led to his eventual victory in 1949 (Metz, p. 29).  Contrary to the typical American 
military view that there is (and should be) a separation between politics and war, Mao 
believed that political activities “are the life of both the guerrilla armies and of 
revolutionary warfare” (Mao, p. 88). 
Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, has noted that 
insurgents have the edge in local political expertise and will continue to engage us at this 
level to avoid our conventional military strengths (Cordesman, 2005).  Their advantages 
stem from their better understanding and manipulation of the complex inner workings of 
the local societies they attempt to influence.  A good example of this is al Qaeda’s tactic 
of marrying into and enmeshing themselves in the local population (Meyer, 2008). 
To outdo the insurgents in this regard means we have to take the time to become 
experts ourselves on local politics, to the extent that we can.  In Afghanistan, that means 
getting involved in the local jirgas which are “the legitimate governing institution in 
Pashtun areas” (Jones, WSJ, p. 4).  Iraq has a similar mechanism called a qada, where 
leaders get together to make local level decisions.  These local leaders can become 
powerful allies in effective PRCM implementation. 
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Next, we must have an aggressive policy of leader engagement in order to be able 
to influence local politics.  Here we can use a carrot and stick approach, rewarding 
productive behavior and punishing disruptive behavior.  If properly managed, this 
process can also help to increase governmental and COIN force legitimacy. 
In terms of PRCMs, local gatherings like jirgas, qadas, etc. can be used as forums 
through which to inform the locals about particular PRCMs, and explain the rationale 
behind them to try and garner the populace’s support, and describe the circumstances for 
their removal.  This process can help to significantly mitigate the inconvenience the 
population experiences from the PRCMs and can help build legitimacy for them. 
A final note about politics: We must also take into consideration local business 
interests.  We must, to the extent possible, avoid disrupting both legal and illegal business 
(so long as it is not connected to the insurgency) because that is one of the surest ways to 
turn the local power brokers against us.  Al Qaeda in Iraq made this mistake and paid 
dearly for it.  One of the biggest reasons why many of the Sunni tribes turned against al 
Qaeda during the Anbar Awakening was that their activities had “disrupted tribal 
business ventures, including smuggling and construction enterprises” (Bruno, 2009). 
When planning PRCMs, a smart commander must accommodate business 
dealings because the area’s long-term financial success is in his best interests.  
C. CULTURAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CALIBRATION 
COIN operations differ significantly from conventional warfare in their emphasis 
on the population.  In conventional warfare, military commanders focus on maneuvering 
forces across the terrain in order to gain an advantage over the enemy.  In this paradigm, 
commanders have traditionally placed little emphasis on the population short of planning 
considerations for dealing with refugees and other civilians on the battlefield.  But in 
COIN, the population takes on a whole new significance, which makes knowing and 
understanding the local cultural and sociological dynamics critical. 
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The U.S. military has a long and mixed history in dealing with anthropological 
studies in a COIN environment.  Montgomery McFate, a cultural anthropologist, recounts 
a version of this history in her article Anthropology and Counterinsurgency:  The Strange 
Story of their Curious Relationship.  She cites two interconnected reasons for the U.S. 
military’s current lack of cultural awareness.  First, she argues that “anthropology is 
largely and conspicuously absent as a discipline within our national-security enterprise” 
(McFate, p. 26).  Secondly, she blames this lack of anthropological study on the U.S. 
military’s failure in Vietnam and its bad experiences with counterinsurgency warfare.  
Essentially, the Vietnam War produced a generation of military leaders who decided that 
COIN warfare should best be dealt with by avoiding it (McFate, p. 26–27). 
To fix what McFate has termed “a culture knowledge gap” (McFate, p. 24) she 
has become instrumental in the military’s renaissance of anthropological studies.  McFate 
wrote parts of the Army’s COIN manual, helped plan the “surge” in Iraq, evaluates 
military training programs, and helped establish the military’s Human Terrain Team 
program (Stannard, 2007). 
This local knowledge gap is particularly pronounced at the tactical level with 
regards to PRCMs.  The PRCMs instituted by a commander must be calibrated to fit with 
the cultural and societal norms of the population they are meant to control.  If they are not 
in tune with the population, the COIN forces risk further alienating the population, 
resulting in completely ineffective population control.  All this can add fuel to the 
insurgency’s fire. 
One oft-cited example of this phenomenon in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the 
checkpoint that is manned by an infantry platoon with no female soldiers.  Muslim 
culture prohibits male soldiers from thoroughly inspecting women who come through the 
checkpoint.  Without a female soldier available, the leader at the checkpoint is left with 
two bad choices:  to let the woman through without inspecting her, or to inspect her and 
inadvertently insult her and her entire family.  
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D. LEGITIMACY FACTORS 
Current U.S. Army doctrine describes a COIN campaign as a battle for legitimacy 
between the government and the insurgents.  Therefore, it is important that we understand 
the definition of legitimacy with regard to political stability and revolutionary warfare.  In 
his book Why Men Rebel, Ted Robert Gurr, an expert on political conflict, defines 
legitimacy by distilling from the literature three main points.  First, according to Gurr 
legitimacy requires “positive perspectives on politics” which makes citizens willing to 
support and obey the government.  This results in “a generalized sense of identification 
with and feelings of obligation toward the regime” that further encourages compliance.  
Finally, Gurr qualifies the definition by stating that “regimes are not considered 
legitimate if compliance is based primarily on coercion” because without that coercion 
the compliance will likely not occur (Gurr, 1970, p. 185).   
Simplifying this a bit further, we can use the idea of public support.  The greater 
the level of public support a government receives, the more likely the population is to 
follow its rules and the less coercion it will need to effectively govern.  The opposite is 
also true.  The greater the public support for the insurgency the more powerful the 
insurgency will become. 
This dynamic is reflected in current U.S. Army doctrine.  FM 3-24 identifies 
legitimacy as the main objective in a COIN campaign and explains that “all governments 
rule through a combination of consent and coercion” (p. 1–21).  This tends to be 
particularly true of a government that is facing an insurgency.  Since the government 
must work to increase its legitimacy in order to increase its support amongst the 
population, it must balance this with its use coercive measures to ensure its survival.   
These coercive measures can take many forms utilizing varying degrees of force.  
They can range from direct military action against armed insurgents or police actions 
such as arresting illegal dissidents, to limited coercive measures like press controls and 
travel restrictions.  Such measures are all designed to control the population and allow the 
government to maintain its hold on power.  The degree to which these measures are 
considered necessary is often proportional to the legitimacy of those conducting these 
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acts, as well as the perceived legitimacy of the actions themselves.  “The relationship 
between legitimacy and compliance is generally a close one,” writes Gurr (Gurr, 1970, p. 
186). 
Often, non-insurgents—e.g., the general population—experience these repressive 
measures in the form of PRCMs.  In order for the PRCMs to be most effective, it is 
important that they be viewed as legitimate by a majority of the population.  If they are 
not, then as sociology professors Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl argue about the 
micromobilization process, the possibility of people joining the insurgency, “may be 
more likely to occur the more repression is considered illegitimate” (Opp & Roehl, p. 
526).  Legitimacy issues, thus, must be considered among the most important factors in 
the effective planning, implementation, and execution of PRCMs.   
Clearly, the legitimacy of the actor and actions are tightly linked and cannot be 
thought of separately.  These legitimacies have interactive and cumulative effects on each 
other.  For the sake of explanation, I will treat them separately in the section below, but 
they should not be thought of as two discrete categories. 
E. ACTOR 
In keeping with a simplified understanding of legitimacy as the public’s support, I 
would say that legitimacy of the actor reflects how the population views the government 
and the corresponding degree of support the government receives from the people.  This 
support can be demonstrated by a strong government with large-scale participation in the 
governing process.  Legitimacy of the actor refers to the actors that exist and operate on 
both the macro and micro levels.  When examining actor legitimacy at the macro level, 
we are talking about the whole of government.  This encompasses everything that the 
government does or, as is often the case in a regime facing an insurgency, everything the 
government fails to do.  At the micro level, the focus is on COIN forces, and particularly 
the military and police forces that actually implement the coercive elements of the 
government’s larger COIN campaign. 
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According to population-centric COIN theory, it is self-defeating to use coercive 
measures that reduce the government’s legitimacy because that will force the government 
to have to use even more coercive measures to stay in power.  This type of behavior leads 
a government, through its own incompetence, to grant an insurgency the political 
opportunities it needs to grow and prosper. 
F. GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY 
The idea of governmental legitimacy is central to population-centric COIN 
planning, but it is also important to tactical level commanders involved in the COIN 
fight.  Even though Lieutenants or Captains have a very limited ability to affect the 
government’s legitimacy, aside from ensuring the professional behavior of their 
subordinates, the government’s legitimacy effects how they must operate.  It should 
affect how we select, implement, and execute our PRCMs. 
The first step is to determine the government’s degree of legitimacy.  This can be 
gauged in many ways, via public opinion polls, by holding town hall meetings, by 
interviewing traditional leaders (tribal, religious, etc.), by reading local newspapers, and 
simply by interacting with the population.  To aid in this, FM 3-24 lists the following 
indicators of legitimate governments: the ability to provide for the population’s security; 
political leaders who are chosen in a manner that is considered fair and just by a majority; 
a high level of participation in the political process; a culturally acceptable level of 
corruption; a culturally acceptable level of political, social, and economic development; 
and regime acceptance by important social institutions (FM 3-24, p. 1–21). 
The government must then be responsive to the needs of the population.  It must 
seek to meet the population’s basic needs related to security, shelter, food, public 
sanitation, etc.  There has been considerable attention paid recently to Abraham 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs with the aim of using this to develop a methodology for 
determining and prioritizing the population’s needs in a COIN environment. 
However, while meeting basic needs can alleviate some of the population’s initial 
problems, in order to ensure longer-term stability the government must also address the 
population’s legitimate grievances regarding its governance.  One approach is to bring 
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political dissidents into the government.  Another approach is to create a transparent set 
of governmental checks and balances, possibly administered by an outside organization 
such as the UN, which is responsive to the population and seen as a forum for redress 
against governmental misdeeds or incompetence.  However, to work this approach must 
be perceived by the population to have the ability to affect change. 
Not only will these steps increase legitimacy, they have the added benefit of 
improving citizens’ lives, eliminating issues that insurgents exploit, creating 
governmental buy-in from political dissidents and their followers and, most importantly, 
reducing the insurgency’s appeal.  This, in turn, reduces the manpower pool from which 
the insurgency can draw.  These changes also enable the citizens to go from 
actively/passively supporting the insurgency to actively/passively supporting the 
government.  Essentially, doing this achieves the exact opposite of what the insurgency is 
trying to do to the government. 
On an international level, as the government gains legitimacy it can attract 
support and recognition from abroad.  Aid and other types of support often follow as a 
government gains or regains its footing.  Oftentimes this occurs after an election or when 
there is a sustained period of relative stability and only limited episodes of violence.  This 
reinforces the government’s legitimacy and adds to the momentum it needs to secure 
public support. 
G. COIN FORCE LEGITIMACY 
The second actor of relevance is the COIN force.  I use the term COIN force to 
designate the forces that carry out the military and policing functions in a COIN 
campaign.  This distinction between the COIN forces and other aspects of the 
government’s larger COIN campaign allows us to focus on issues that are more relevant 
to PRCM implementation.  If the force that conducts PRCMs is seen as illegitimate, the 
measures themselves will be seen as invalid and the population will resist them. 
There are many benefits to the COIN force gaining and maintaining legitimacy.  
First, this will build and reinforce the government’s legitimacy.  Population-centric COIN 
theory suggests that with legitimacy comes the support and help of the population.  This 
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support and help can best be leveraged through the information the population provides 
to the COIN forces.  Their willing assistance will take away the insurgents’ greatest 
strength, which is their ability to hide and blend in with the population. 
There are some key indicators that reveal the extent of the COIN force’s 
legitimacy.  These include the level of security that it maintains in a given area, the 
number of reports of abuses of power, the amount and quality of intelligence which is 
generated through citizens voluntarily offering information, and the population’s overall 
view and assessment of it to name a few.  The easiest way to gauge popular perception is 
to ask the population and their local leaders for their opinions.  Another method is to 
watch their interactions with the population.  Does the population exchange greetings or 
do they avoid contact at all costs? 
The single biggest means of improving the COIN force’s legitimacy is through 
professionalization.  Professionalizing the force includes selecting the right personnel, 
setting high training standards, instilling the necessary discipline, educating the 
leadership, and weeding out the personnel who cannot conform to high ethical standards.  
COIN is a manpower intensive task, but it must be conducted by the right people 
especially when we speak of increasing a force’s legitimacy.  As the old saying goes, “it 
only takes a couple of bad apples to ruin the barrel.”  A follow up must be to reward the 
COIN force members well in order to make them less susceptible to corruption. 
Professionalizing an external COIN force, such as foreign troops assisting a 
government in putting down the insurgency, presents somewhat different challenges.  It is 
preferable to have host nation (indigenous) personnel take the lead with PRCMs to lend 
the control measures more legitimacy.  But that may not always be feasible.  In these 
circumstances, outsiders need to fully understand and appreciate the local point of view, 
be aware of cultural and sociological differences, and maintain discipline.  The debacle at 
Abu Ghraib shows how the actions of a few undisciplined National Guard soldiers hurt 
the legitimacy of the entire U.S. military and, by extension, the U.S. and Iraqi 
governments.  
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Hand in hand with professionalism is the necessity for the COIN force to operate 
within the guidelines of accepted behavior.  The most commonly accepted guide to 
appropriate behavior is the law of land warfare.  Typically, the COIN force has additional 
restrictions imposed on it by higher headquarters in order to control its soldiers’ actions 
with the express goal of bolstering the government’s legitimacy.  Again, Ricks illustrates 
this in his description of Colonel McMaster’s troops in Tall Afar.  Colonel McMaster 
focused on the professional manner with which his troops were expected to act.  He told 
them that “every time you treat an Iraqi disrespectfully, you are working for the enemy” 
and taught them to “treat detainees professionally; do not tolerate abusive behavior” 
(Ricks, 2009, p. 60).  As this example suggests, commanders at each level have the 
ability to issue more specific (and respectful) commander’s guidance to suit the needs of 
his specific area. 
One theory about how a COIN force should react to insurgent actions has been 
developed by Professor Gordon McCormick at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
McCormick’s theory of equivalent response is designed to help guide a force in 
determining the appropriate responses to insurgent actions.  He postulates that there is a 
spectrum of acceptable responses that reflect the scope and nature of the violence that the 
population will not only accept, but will expect.  He further explains that if a government 
reaction to insurgent action is considered too violent or not strong enough, the COIN 
forces (and government by extension) will lose legitimacy (McCormick, 2008). 
McCormick’s model also helps to illustrate the importance and 
interconnectedness of the legitimacy of the actor and the legitimacy of the action.  The 
actions of the COIN force directly relate to and result in its legitimacy.  This is why the 
legitimacy of the action can also be thought of as the cumulative effects of understanding 
the environment, knowing the local history, being culturally and sociologically well 
calibrated, and having legitimacy as the actor. 
PRCMs are measures designed to restrict and control the population.  Therefore, 
these restrictions need to be appreciated as costs (or inconveniences) placed upon the 
population.  Legitimacy mitigates how burdensome the costs are thought to be by the 
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population.  If the people know and understand that the control measures are necessary, 
then the population will be much more likely to accept, obey, and support them. 
Another way to further mitigate the frustration felt by the population at the 
imposition of PRCMs is offered by Anderson and Volesky.  They recommend that the 
government should publicly “define the conditions that must be met before the population 
control measures are reduced” (Military Review, p. 103).  Doing so will give the 
population the feeling that they have some control over their future and allow them to 
work towards that goal. 
H. RISKS INVOLVED WITH THE USE OF PRCMS 
PRCMs are a vital part of any COIN strategy.  If done correctly they bring many 
benefits to a COIN commander, chief among them being the wedge they drive between 
the population and insurgency.  Ideally, they should help break the cycle of violence, and 
generate useful intelligence.  But, to be sure, there are also risks involved in the use of 
PRCMs.  The very nature of PRCMs is to control the population and therefore these 
restrictions have a repressive character.  Whether it is a checkpoint that disrupts daily 
traffic or a curfew that restricts the population to their homes, PRCMs at a minimum are 
an inconvenience to the people affected.  Initially, when the violence is high, the 
population may more readily accept them.  But, as violence wanes, the inconvenience 
threshold goes down.  Any given population will have its own unique level of tolerance 
for repression, which, if not managed, can lead to negative consequences. 
Professors David Hess and Brian Martin write that social movement theory 
(SMT) tells us that repression can result in transformative events, in outrage, and can 
backfire.  Hess and Martin define these terms in the following way: a transformative 
event is “a crucial turning point for a social movement that dramatically increases or 
decreases the level of mobilization;” outrage is “the reaction of individuals to events 
perceived as unjust, illegitimate, or otherwise inappropriate;” and backfire is “a public 
reaction of outrage to an event that is publicized and perceived as unjust” (Hess & 
Martin, p. 2). 
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A recent and easy example of a transformative event, which created outrage and 
had a significant backfire effect, is the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib.  Although 
there is no way to know the numbers of Iraqis who became insurgents because of Abu 
Ghraib, it is commonly agreed that the scandal gave a significant boost to the insurgency 
and hurt the legitimacy of the coalition. 
The same phenomenon can happen if PRCMs are not carried out correctly.  The 
misapplication or poor implementation of a PRCM can turn a local population against the 
COIN campaign.  A proper understanding of what fits the situation along with continued 
assessments of the environment coupled with the cultivation of legitimacy, can help to 
mitigate or eliminate this problem. 
There are also some tactical risks when conducting PRCMs.  Chief among these 
risks is that, in order to control the population, we typically force people to congregate – 
like at a checkpoint.  This helps us minimize the resources required to run the PRCM, but 
it also gives the insurgents a high casualty-producing target to attack.  This is a tactic that 
insurgents in Iraq have used to great effect (“Car bomb kills 8 at checkpoint in western 
Iraq,” 2009).  In the eyes of the population, we can often be blamed because we set up the 
conditions that created this tempting target. 
I. INTERACTION OF VARIABLES AND PRESCRIPTIVE 
RECOMMENDATION 
The social interactions that govern the success or failure of PRCMs in COIN are 
varied and extremely complicated.  No formula can be developed into a cookie cutter 
solution to determine the likely success or failure of specific PRCMs.  However, I believe 
that there is an interactive relationship between the environment on one hand, and the 
factors that lead to or detract from legitimacy on the other.  Monitoring this relationship 
through continual assessments can help commanders avoid the risks of PRCMs.  
Understanding the nature of how environmental and legitimacy factors interact will allow 
a commander to successfully utilize PRCMs to their full effect. 
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My contention is that as your understanding and capabilities to manipulate the 
environmental factors improve, by extension so do your interactions with the population 
and local leaders.  This, in turn, should enhance your overall legitimacy.  With 
legitimacy, it becomes possible to implement PRCMs that will be more acceptable to the 
population because they are more effective.  In other words, as your environmental 
awareness (and actions in relation to it) improve, your legitimacy will increase.  This will 
have the added benefit of increasing the intelligence you can gather and will result in a 
more effective COIN campaign plan.  In an optimal situation, these intangible effects will 
result in the momentum necessary to separate the population from the insurgents and give 
the non-military aspects (long-term economic growth, governmental reforms, etc.) a 
chance to take hold. 
On the other hand, if COIN force legitimacy decreases through a transformative 
event, backfire, or general governmental loss of legitimacy—as is currently occurring in 
Afghanistan with the election debacle—then working with the environmental parameters 
will become more difficult.  This will lead to decreased PRCM effectiveness, which will 
in turn cost legitimacy.  Here a commander has little recourse but to work on regaining 
legitimacy at least at the tactical level. 
Legitimacy also feeds into how much “slack” the population is willing to extend 
to the COIN force, and can hereby help shape environmental conditions.  The more 
legitimacy that a force has, the more political, social, and cultural faux pas the population 
will accept before some kind of backfire may occur. 
Additionally, legitimacy affects the amount of access the COIN force may have to 
the population and its leaders.  Here, I define access as both physical and mental.  The 
Nazis had little legitimacy in occupied Yugoslavia and enjoyed a certain amount of 
physical access to the Yugoslav people.  I would argue that due to the illegitimate way in 
which Germany occupied Yugoslavia, no matter how well the Germans manipulated the 
environmental factors, they had no real access to the Yugoslav psyche and were never 
considered legitimate.  This, in turn, created a situation where Yugoslav partisans were 
able to operate successfully with the support of a large portion of the population.  The 
population considered the partisans more legitimate than their German occupiers.   
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J. PRESCRIPTIVE RECOMMENDATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
A PRCM PLAN AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
To sum up thus far, we must understand and actively try to manipulate the 
environment in our favor.  This will give our PRCMs the best chance of achieving their 
objectives.  As we succeed, we will garner increased legitimacy for both actor and action 
which will make our ability to manipulate the environment that much easier.  
Understanding and utilizing the nature of the relationship between the environmental 
factors and legitimacy is key in establishing effective PRCMs.  
A well thought out and synchronized local PRCM plan begins with an evaluation 
of the PRCMs organized according to what is feasible at the strategic, operational, or 
tactical levels, as per the recommendations in the Anderson and Volesky article.  For 
instance, it should be easy to discover whether strategic-level PRCMs have already been 
implemented.  U.S. Army doctrine and the majority of COIN theorists agree on the 
strategic level steps that are necessary to affect a successful PRCM plan.  The initial steps 
prescribed in the literature include conducting a census and issuing of national 
identification cards (FM 3-24, p. 5–21; Galula, p. 66; Anderson and Volesky, p. 102).  
Anderson and Volesky’s article, which places its greatest emphasis on the strategic level, 
offers some additional suggestions, such as: a biometrics registration (tied to ID cards if 
possible); instituting a weapons registration program; establishing border entry control 
points; strict rule-of-law policies; enforcing a public assembly permit policy; and 
economic recovery programs (Anderson and Volesky, p. 102).  FM 3-24 advises some 
more restrictive measures, such as curfews and travel restrictions that may help with 
population control in particularly violent areas or times (FM 3-24, p. 5–21). 
If these measures have not been enacted, it is important to ask why not.  Are there 
reasons these measures could not be implemented at the strategic level?  Or does their 
absence represent a flaw in the COIN campaign plan?  Either way, local commanders 
must determine the feasibility of implementing them on a local basis, which will depend 
on the environmental and legitimacy factors described above. 
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A further consideration should be how to incentivize the PRCMs, particularly 
measures such as participation in census, ID card, and biometric programs.  Based on the 
needs of the locals something as simple as a bag of rice, necessary medical care, or cash 
rewards may be all that is necessary to get the majority of the population willing to 
participate. 
Critical to working through the environmental and legitimacy factors is getting 
local leader buy-in, both formally and informally.  This effort may require extending 
extra incentives to these leaders.  If done correctly and by, with, or through some facet of 
the government, this entire process can help to increase the government’s legitimacy and 
make future attempts at other PRCMs easier.  If you can obtain buy-in from local leaders, 
they would be optimal candidates to inform the population about these measures. 
At the operational level, it is important to develop your plan and get as much pre-
approval as possible, especially for resources.  Nothing can erode your legitimacy like 
planning for certain PRCMs, getting local buy in, and then not being able to conduct 
them due to resource or legal constraints. 
Additionally, your analysis should include how surrounding units’ areas of 
operations affect your area, and how second and third order effects from your PRCMs 
might extend to their areas.  This analysis is critical to adjacent commanders being able to 
coordinate their PRCM plans and will assist in their being on the lookout for indicators of 
expected and unexpected consequences. 
At the tactical level, selecting your PRCMs should be based on your tactical 
assessment combined with your intended objectives.  Once you have selected the tactical 
level PRCMs to accomplish your objectives, you should run them through the same 
vetting process mentioned earlier to establish strategic PRCMs.  Again, as much of this 
process should be conducted by government representatives as is feasible. 
Finally, there is a need for continual reassessment of the effectiveness of the 
PRCMs to determine how long they should be continued, and to gauge the positive 
and/or negative effects they are having on the population.  Assessments will help the 
commander be able to determine when and if he should remove the PRCMs.  
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Collectively, this process should help to increase legitimacy, mitigate public 
inconvenience, and reduce the possibility of backfire. 
There may also come a time when the local government may completely take 
over this process, especially the decision about when to remove the PRCMs.  In most 
COIN environments, it is considered good when the local and national governments are 
ready and able to make these decisions.  A time may even come when you do not agree 
with the government’s decisions and that will be cause for another detailed reassessment 
of the environment and perceptions related to the government’s legitimacy. 
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IV. PUTTING PRCMS INTO PRACTICE 
To better illustrate how a leader can develop and incorporate a comprehensive 
PRCM plan into a COIN campaign, I offer the following fictional narrative account.  We 
will follow Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jones as he commands his infantry battalion, the 1st 
Battalion, from deployment notification through PRCM implementation and beyond. 
LTC Jones is a seasoned veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  This 
upcoming deployment will be his third combat deployment to Iraq.  Since his last tour in 
Baghdad, LTC Jones has become a real student of COIN theory and history.  He has 
studied FM 3-24, read much of its recommended reading list, and regularly visits the 
Small Wars Journal Web site (www.smallwarsjournal.com) to interact with his peers on 
COIN-related topics. 
The soldiers of the 1st Battalion received notification that they would deploy to 
Iraq one year out from the deployment date.  Immediately upon notification, LTC Jones, 
along with his Battalion Operations Officer, Major (MAJ) Jennings, developed a 
challenging pre-mission training (PMT) regimen that was dually focused on urban 
infantry combat skills and the education of the battalion’s soldiers on the Iraqi theater of 
operations.  Because the battalion did not know its exact deployment location, this 
education focused on general information such as: an overview of Iraqi history; the 
history and practices of Islam; Iraqi cultural and sociological norms and taboos; and 
finally, basic Arabic language study with an emphasis on important phrases.  LTC Jones 
knew that his soldiers would need this information in order to understand the 
environment in which they would be operating.  The PMT followed this pattern for the 
next nine months. 
Three months prior to deployment, LTC Jones and fifteen of the battalion’s key 
leaders went to Iraq on a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS).  LTC Jones used the PDSS 
to hone the battalion in on its pinpoint location, the city of Gharya, which is located in 
north-central Iraq.  He hoped to obtain as much information as possible from the unit that 
they would be replacing. 
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Prior to departure for the PDSS, LTC Jones instructed his subordinates that he 
was particularly interested in three areas: intelligence about the area of operations (AO); 
a history of the coalition’s operations in the area, which he could evaluate through the 
prism of his newfound COIN knowledge; and finally, a logistical estimate from his 
Battalion Supply Officer. 
In terms of intelligence, LTC Jones was of course interested in the AO’s insurgent 
picture, but he also instructed his Intelligence Officer, Captain (CPT) Driver, to spend 
most of his time learning about the local population.  This included everything he could 
find out about the local history, demographics (ethnic and religious), leadership (formal 
and informal), tribal affiliations and interactions, economy, and politics. 
LTC Jones had similar instructions for MAJ Jennings.  Jennings was instructed to 
not only spend time on the operational history of the AO, but to ensure that he learned as 
much as he could about the Iraqi forces that the battalion would be partnered with.  This 
included the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) that lived and worked in Gharya.  MAJ 
Jennings, himself already an OIF veteran, quickly picked up the system of operations 
inside the battalion headquarters and spent a significant amount of his time meeting with 
the battalion’s future Iraqi partners.  He went along with the IA on several operations in 
order to observe their effectiveness and evaluate their training levels. 
Finally, LTC Jones instructed CPT Greene, his logistician, to learn about the Iraqi 
theater’s supply system for Army materials.  He also wanted information about the local 
procurement system.  Specifically, Jones wanted to know about host nation contractors 
and construction companies.  If possible, he wanted to be able to leverage as much local 
labor and industry as possible. 
LTC Jones had an ambitious plan for himself during the PDSS.  He planned on 
spending the first couple of days getting an overview of the AO from the current unit’s 
battalion commander.  He needed to understand the basics of the AO before launching 
into what he considered his most important task during the PDSS—meeting the 
influential leaders in Gharya.  He was able to meet with the mayor, police chief, tribal 
sheiks, and some of the influential imams. 
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The PDSS was mostly a success in terms of information gathered but the 1st 
Battalion soldiers were surprised by the extent of violence and the insurgency’s grip on 
the population in Gharya.  They quickly came to realize that the upcoming year was 
going to be extremely challenging. 
For his part, LTC Jones was concerned that the incumbent unit seemed to lack a 
comprehensive and coherent COIN strategy.  They seemed to flounder between offensive 
combat operations and uncoordinated civil affairs projects under a misguided attempt at a 
“carrot and stick” approach to COIN. 
LTC Jones was also very concerned with the IA unit operating in Gharya.  Based 
on MAJ Jennings’ report, the IA battalion was not an effective force because the soldiers 
were undisciplined, lacked basic soldier’s skills, and were only concerned with their own 
force protection.  This was compounded by the fact that the IA leadership didn’t 
understand that their actions were making the situation worse. 
This was confirmed during LTC Jones’ conversations with the local leaders and 
population.  The population believed that the IA soldiers did not care about the people of 
Gharya, therefore they were unwilling to help the IA. 
Upon returning to the U.S., LTC Jones had his subordinates prepare a PDSS 
findings report in an effort to disseminate as much pertinent information as possible to 
everyone in the battalion.  This report would become the basis from which the battalion 
would conduct an assessment in order to develop an initial plan and revise its current 
PMT schedule. 
As LTC Jones read the PDSS report, he realized that the incumbent unit’s biggest 
problem was that it received no support from the population.  He further hypothesized, 
given the high number and intense violence of attacks against the population, that the 
U.S. forces in Gharya couldn’t protect the population.  Jones needed to develop a plan 
that would: protect the population; identify and separate the insurgents from the 
population; and finally, cut off the resources (people and materiel) that the insurgency 
required to continue its attacks. 
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After much research and many late nights at the office, the 1st Battalion staff, 
under LTC Jones’ guidance, developed an initial concept of operations that focused on 
the use of PRCMs to accomplish LTC Jones’ intent.  They wisely incorporated continual 
reassessments that would allow them to revise their plans as they learned more about 
Gharya and as the situation changed. 
The transition between the outgoing unit and 1st Battalion went relatively 
smoothly.  The 1st Battalion soldiers tried to learn as much as possible during the two-
week transition period. 
Upon the departure of the previous unit, 1st Battalion began the first phase of its 
plan to quell the insurgency in Gharya.  The main effort of this phase was to conduct a 
detailed study of the local situation.  LTC Jones needed to truly understand his AO.  In 
addition, LTC Jones knew that he needed to quickly improve and integrate with his IA 
counterpart unit.  To accomplish this, LTC Jones ordered the development of a training 
program for the Iraqis.  He believed this would pay significant dividends down the road. 
1st Battalion developed a three-pronged approach to better learning its AO.  LTC 
Jones had given his unit six weeks to do this, so the steps happened concurrently.  First, 
the battalion conducted a detailed assessment of the area.  MAJ Jennings found that the 
1st SFG PRC Handbook’s assessment tool (1st SFG, p. 174–212) offered a great start-off 
point.  Jennings tailored it to what was already known about Gharya and sent the updated 
template to his subordinate companies.  The companies conducted individual assessments 
within their company AOs. 
The second part of this approach was key leader engagements across all of 
Gharya.  LTC Jones put his personal focus here.  He worked with higher-level local 
leaders such as the mayor, IA commander, Chief of Police, and the most influential 
sheiks of each tribe.  LTC Jones tried to meet with a different leader or group of leaders 
every day.  He emphasized this focus with his company commanders by instructing them 
to do the same with local leaders in their company AOs. 
 
 39
Finally, 1st Battalion reached out to the local Special Forces Operational 
Detachment-Alpha (ODA or A Team) that was living on the same combat outpost (COP).  
The ODA responded by briefing the battalion on its capabilities and mission.  LTC Jones 
instructed MAJ Jennings to coordinate and facilitate ODA missions to the extent that he 
could.  The ODA, in turn, promised to share intelligence.  This was significant because 
the battalion would be able to leverage some of the intelligence the ODA received from 
its vast network of informants. 
LTC Jones felt so strongly about the importance of training the IA that he set 
aside his scout platoon as a cadre of instructors for the Iraqis.  Based on MAJ Jennings’ 
assessment of the IA and input from the IA Battalion Commander, a training plan was 
developed that focused on basic and collective soldier skills such as: basic rifle 
marksmanship, first aid, conduct of dismounted urban patrols, running checkpoints, use 
of biometrics equipment, and conducting raids.  More importantly, law-of-land warfare 
classes were also taught.  LTC Jones believed these skills would greatly increase the IA 
effectiveness and professionalism.  In an effort to illustrate this to the people of Gharya, 
LTC Jones invited local leaders to the IA graduation ceremonies at the end of the training 
cycle.  He believed that this was an important first step in establishing the IA’s legitimacy 
with the people of Gharya. 
During this entire phase, the battalion’s staff was busy compiling and analyzing 
all the information that was being collected.  This new information, combined with the 
known enemy situation, formed the battalion’s initial understanding of the environment.  









Figure 2.   Summary of findings 
From this summary of findings and a steep upturn in violence, LTC Jones put his 
staff back to work to devise a plan of action.  His biggest priority was to reduce violence 
in order to protect the population.  He believed that he could not affect any other change 
unless he first secured and controlled Gharya. 
In response, the staff devised a PRCM-heavy plan that had four sequential steps.  
First, LTC Jones called a meeting with all the local leaders where he laid out his plan to 
establish security in Gharya.  The plan sought to enforce existing control measures and 
enforce new ones in and around Gharya.  After explaining his plan, he listened in turn, as 
the local leaders were allowed to comment and give their input on the plan. 
Not all of the locals were happy with the plan, but LTC Jones assured them that 
these measures would exist only as long as the threat level merited them.  Sheiks from 




respective tribes together, and the Chief of Police recommended making certain roads 
one-way routes for ease of movement and control.  LTC Jones agreed and added both 
suggestions to the plan. 
LTC Jones then asked each of these leaders to publicly support the plan.  He 
conducted a media blitz by publicizing the plan in the local newspapers, on local radio 
stations, and by spreading leaflets.  What Jones wanted was for these leaders to 
participate in the media events.  In exchange, Jones offered that, once security was 
established, he would bring in coordinated civil affairs projects that would benefit each of 
them.  Not all of the leaders agreed to help, but at least a few did, and that was a good 
start.  These local leaders’ endorsements would help to legitimize these measures in the 
eyes of the people. 
Additionally, LTC Jones, along with the Mayor and Chief of Police, established 
punishment guidelines for those not following the new rules they were about to establish.  
The penalties were to be publicized along with the plan during the media blitz and ranged 
from monetary fines to confiscation of property and imprisonment.  LTC Jones decided 
that to add a further deterrent effect to these measures individual punishments were to be 
made public in the newspaper and on public notices posted around the city. 
LTC Jones understood that enforcing these measures was important to their 
success.  He explained this critical requirement to his staff by instructing them to select 
only PRCMs that could be strictly enforced.  Unenforced control measures would only 
spread confusion and reduce legitimacy because these measures would be viewed as 
another failure by the COIN forces. 
After incorporating ideas from the local leaders, the plan was put into action.  The 
first phase of the plan started with a surge in operations and forces focused on controlling 
the city.  The forces used were combined elements of 1st Battalion and IA soldiers.  The 
companies, in their respective AOs, strong pointed areas throughout the city in an effort 
to control it.  The curfew was enforced for the first time in over a year.  This part of the 
plan was extremely manpower-intensive and could not be maintained for a long period of 
time. 
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Engineer assets from the division and brigade converged on Gharya and built a 
barrier around the entire city.  In most places, the barrier was made with a large berm.  In 
other areas where a berm was not practical, the barrier was made from either T-walls or 
chain link and concertina fencing.  The barrier allowed for controlled access with only 
three entry points into the city located in the north, west, and southeast.  These access 
points corresponded with the main roads leading into the city.  They were controlled by 
combined U.S./IA units that conducted searches of vehicles and personnel as they entered 
the city.  In order to accommodate the searching of females, 1st Battalion received 
eighteen female soldiers to work at these entry points. 
The entry points themselves were elaborate configurations with four lanes of 
traffic entering and leaving the city.  During rush hours, the numbers of lanes, either 
going out of or entering the city, could be adjusted to accommodate the traffic.  To the 
side of each entry point was an open area where detailed vehicle searches could be 
conducted.  The soldiers who manned these entry points were given criteria on whom to 
search.  They searched all large trucks, buses, and any car with multiple-military aged 
males.  The remainder of vehicle searches was conducted on a random basis.  The 
soldiers would receive different instructions each day as to how to conduct these 
searches.  One day it would be every third car and the next day it would be every fifth 
car.  Finally, procedures were put into place that would allow the entry control points to 
quickly relay information about wanted personnel or vehicles. 
To aid in the vehicle searches, the soldiers were issued telescoping mirrors and 
were supported by military working dogs trained to detect explosives.  At first, the 
searches were slow, but as the soldiers got more efficient, they were able to maintain an 
acceptable flow of traffic.   
After the barrier with controlled entry points was successfully established, the 
companies left their strong point positions around the city and moved to their newly 
selected checkpoints.  They set up these checkpoints and rerouted necessary traffic 
patterns.  At first, there was a lot of confusion, but much of that was worked out nightly 
during curfew hours. 
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This pattern of life continued for a week while the population was allowed to get 
accustomed to the new way of life in Gharya.  Insurgent attacks went down immediately 
as this operation interrupted their normal attack routines and tactics. 
As the population calmed, coalition troops passed around flyers about the next 
phase.  A combined force of U.S. and IA soldiers, accompanied by cooperating local 
leaders in each company sector, went around during the early hours of the curfew (before 
10 pm) and conducted a census.  This census included taking the typical household 
information, biometric data, and the issuance of an ID card.   
The coalition team also informed the population about the new weapons control 
program that it was instituting.  The new rule stipulated that each family could have one 
AK-47 rifle per household.  These weapons were only for use in home defense and while 
conducting neighborhood watch-type activities.  The coalition team issued weapons 
registration cards that matched individual weapons, by serial number, to the people who 
were authorized to carry them. 
An amnesty period was set up where citizens could turn in extra weapons for 
monetary rewards.  The final piece of the weapons control program included random and 
targeted searches for violators of this policy.  The punishment for breaking this policy 
included the confiscation of the weapon in question and either a monetary fine or 
imprisonment based on the number of contraband weapons seized. 
Additional members of the census team included medical and intelligence 
personnel.  The medic observed and asked medical questions in order to develop an 
understanding of what, if any, medical needs could be answered by a medical civil action 
program (MEDCAP).  The intelligence specialist asked pertinent questions in order to 
gather as much intelligence as possible.  This proved to be an excellent source of 
information because the population was able to anonymously supply the coalition with 
information without fear of the insurgents learning the source. 
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Finally, the teams gave each family small gifts such as fresh fruit or bread, 
clothing, a soccer ball, or candy for the children.  This helped to mitigate any 
inconvenience or frustration felt by the family due to the manner in which the census was 
being conducted. 
Incentives and penalties were developed to ensure that the citizens of Gharya kept 
and used their ID cards.  The penalties were mainly in the form of inconvenience.  Any 
individual who didn’t have his or her ID would either be denied entrance to the city or 
suffer the inconvenience of spending long periods of time at the ID card center waiting in 
line for a new ID.  Repeat offenders would be investigated for ties to the insurgency. 
Additionally, coalition patrols would conduct random ID checks, which included 
certain days where an ID would be required for purchasing items at the market, etc.  
These ID checks would have the secondary effect of forcing the COIN force and 
population to interact and help them develop relationships.  These interactions could also 
serve as a time when citizens could anonymously pass information to the COIN force. 
The incentives included providing MEDCAP services and other beneficial 
government-led aid projects to ID carrying citizens.  ID cards were also required for any 
employment by the Iraqi government or coalition forces.  This was a powerful incentive 
as these were the only well paying jobs available in Gharya.  
Each night, the coalition forces would bring the information they gathered back to 
the battalion where groups of soldiers would update databases, maps, and other 
information sources.  This slowly built a wealth of easily accessible knowledge that had 
never before existed about Gharya.   
During this part of the operation, the units were tasked to conduct a continual 
reassessment of the situation.  This task became much easier as 1st Battalion soldiers had 
much greater access to the population.  Additionally, LTC Jones was able to check the 
pulse of Gharya through his continued and aggressive leader engagement program.  He 
set up a system of checks and balances where the population, primarily through their 
local leaders, could report abuses conducted by either his troops or the local IA.  To 
facilitate this effort, coalition forces rented some strategically placed storefronts around 
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the city in order to give the citizens easy access to this service.  LTC Jones felt strongly 
that this would greatly increase the legitimacy of the coalition’s efforts and by extension 
the coalition itself.  LTC Jones would then investigate reports of abuses and immediately 
rectify the problem if it occurred.  He also set up a system of monetary reimbursements to 
the population for damages caused by coalition operations. 
These storefronts also served as the source for governmental paperwork such as 
passports, weapons registration, etc.  This gave the population an excuse for visiting 
governmental offices and the ability to pass information without the insurgency finding 
out.  This greatly increased the amount of intelligence received by coalition forces. 
At the one-month mark of the implementation of LTC Jones’ PRCM plan, the 
battalion staff produced another report detailing the most current situation (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3.   Reassessment of findings and results 
Having secured the control and security of Gharya, LTC Jones then turned his 
focus to measures that would maintain and build long-term security.  He ordered his staff 
to develop a list of projects that would benefit the population using the battalion’s boots-
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on-the-ground experience, the results of the assessment process, and requests he had 
received through the leader engagement process.   
The staff came up with a list of four projects that could make a difference for the 
city and its people.  Two of the projects—the maintenance of the electrical power station 
and the sewage system—were larger projects that would take some time to accomplish.  
To offset that, the staff picked two other projects that could be accomplished quickly and 
could have a more immediate effect.  Once again, through local officials Iraqis were hired 
to conduct “area fix up” tasks like basic reconstruction on public buildings and the 
painting over of graffiti.   
The other project was a series of MEDCAPs evenly distributed across the city 
with the goal of having a medic see every citizen for a quick check up at a minimum.  
LTC Jones believed that the MEDCAPs were important to showcase both the IA and 
Iraqi civilian medical personnel to the population.  Iraqi doctors and medics performed as 
many of the medical services as possible with the U.S. military only acting in a 
supporting role.  This helped to not only distribute medical services, but also build 
governmental legitimacy and develop further connections between the IA and the people.  
It also helped to mark the reestablishment of some pre-war civilian medical clinics as 
these doctors continued to practice locally on completion of the MEDCAPs. 
Besides the intended results of these projects, the coalition forces started receiving 
a lot of information about insurgent forces.  The population was no longer intimidated by 
insurgents.  They did not want to see the gains in their society reverse back into violence 
and chaos.   
Using this new treasure trove of intelligence, coalition forces started conducting 
precision raids both inside and outside Gharya.  This further deteriorated the insurgency’s 
ability to effectively attack the population or coalition forces. 
As violence was significantly reduced, internal politics and business interests 
started to take on added significance.  For example, some of Gharya’s businesses needed 
to move goods and equipment at night.  These businesses were allowed to apply for 
curfew-hour movement passes.  The Chief of Police reviewed each application, with final 
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approval authority resting with LTC Jones.  Other control measures were reduced or 
eliminated as the current situation warranted, but always after reassessment and close 
consideration was paid to the expected consequences.  And again, LTC Jones was the 
approval authority for major changes to his PRCM plan. 
Another by-product of the reduced violence was LTC Jones’ ability to shift more 
of the operational burden to the IA.  This also marked a change in the type of training that 
1st Battalion would conduct with the IA.  Though the tactical training would continue, the 
focus of training would shift to staff and leadership tasks, especially intelligence and 
operations fusion.  LTC Jones needed the Iraqi leaders to start conducting this COIN 
campaign on their own. 
To help the IA battalion commander, LTC Jones brought him to all the key leader 
engagement meetings and slowly inserted him into the “spotlight.”  This made him the 
focal point of coalition operations and further increased his credibility among the local 
leaders of Gharya. 
This process of reassessment and readjustment of PRCMs based on the local 
conditions would continue through the rest of 1st Battalion’s tenure.  LTC Jones would 
ensure that his successor received a full written accounting of what was tried, and what 
did or did not work.  This detailed operational history could be used by follow-on units to 
give them greater historical context for decision making and a basis from which to guide 
their future plans. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If utilized correctly, PRCMs are powerful operational tools that can be used by a 
COIN force to break the cycle of insurgent violence and establish the security necessary 
for all other COIN campaign initiatives.  I believe that a comprehensive PRCM plan, 
instituted across all operational levels, coupled with a deep understanding of the local 
environment and local views of legitimacy are key factors for success in a COIN 
campaign. 
Further research and study is necessary in order to better elaborate on the 
usefulness of PRCMs.  First, a comprehensive study of the PRCMs used in Operations 
Enduring and Iraqi Freedom should be conducted.  During the course of these operations, 
many PRCMs have been used, both successfully and unsuccessfully.  A full accounting 
of these operations would significantly add to our PRCM knowledge.  The study of these 
experiences could have positive operational results as this knowledge would help inform 
our decisions during the course of these continuing conflicts.  But it is also important that 
we conduct this study sooner rather than later, while the commanders and soldiers who 
conducted these operations are still in the U.S. military.  We need to collect this 
information before it is lost so that future generations will not have to relearn these costly 
lessons. 
Next, it is important to understand that insurgents use PRCMs as well.  We must 
determine what measures the insurgents are using and then do our best to counter them.  
For a good example of insurgents successfully using PRCMs, I suggest Bob Andrews’ 
book The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong 
Province, 1960–1964.  Andrews details how the Vietnamese communists effectively used 
PRCMs to control entire villages in South Vietnam.  A detailed study of the PRCMs that 
the insurgents are using in Afghanistan and Iraq will help us better counter their efforts 
and defeat them. 
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Third, we must invest in technological research, which will enable us to better 
conduct PRCMs.  The recent advances in biometrics and surveillance equipment, 
particularly unmanned aerial vehicles, illustrates how new technology can significantly 
increase our ability to implement control measures.  This research should focus on 
technology that will, first, increase the effectiveness of PRCMs, and second, reduce the 
manpower required to conduct them. 
Finally, PRCM background, theory, and new research need to be better integrated 
into the U.S. military’s COIN doctrine.  It is unfortunate that PRCMs can play such an 
important role in COIN operations and yet warrant such a small part of the discussion in 
current U.S. COIN doctrine.  Increased PRCM doctrinal material will help to expose 
larger audiences within the U.S. military to the benefits of correctly implementing these 
measures. 
The use of measures aimed at controlling populations is not new and yet we have 
not established a complete body of lessons learned, never mind doctrine to help us 
effectively institute that control.  PRCMs have been, and will continue to be, an 
important part of any COIN campaign.  This necessitates devoting our resources, 
primarily through the education of military leaders, towards improving those capabilities 
in order for us to be successful in both ongoing and future COIN operations. 
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